AMBUSH IN MALAYA

BY

MAJOR PETER ST. V. HARDING-ROLLS

(AS TOLD TO MAJOR BOB SMITH - BOTH OF 3/KAR)


The golden rules for a successful ambush are: ONE - good information, TWO - careful planning, THREE -. strict observance of drills and FOUR - quick follow up action.
During the uprising in Malaya from 1948 to 1960 most casualties among communist terrorists (CTs) were the result of carefully laid ambushes - a new style of warfare for the British Army following its defeat by the Japanese in 1942.
Before infantry battalions were allowed to carry out operations in jungle, they had to undergo an intensive period of training at the Far East Land Forces Training Centre at Kota Tinggi in South Johore, not far from the causeway linking Malaya with Singapore. General Sir Gerald Templer, the Supremo, who arrived in early 1952 following the ambush and death of Sir Henry Gurney the previous High Commissioner, had good reason to put 'ambush drills' high on his list of priorities.

Lieutenant Peter Harding arrived aboard the troopship ‘DILWARA’ with the main body of the 3rd (Kenya) Battalion King’s African Rifles in Singapore in January 1952. He was a new boy as far as serving with askaris was concerned, having joined the battalion at its home base in Nanyuki only a few months before leaving for Malaya. Not having a platoon of his own he was a general factotum and during the journey from Africa to Singapore he was in charge of the battalion baggage. When he arrived in the Training Centre at Kota Tinggi, where the battalion was to undergo six weeks training, he was appointed Weapons Training Officer and understudy to the Intelligence Officer. Even so, he felt his potential had not been tapped and looked enviously at other more experienced subalterns who commanded platoons and spoke Kiswahili fluently.
His first chance for doing what he called ‘proper soldiering’ came when the Commanding Officer sent him on attachment to the 1/10th Gurkha Rifles who were operating near Kuantan on the east coast of Malaya. After a day’s journey down the Sungei Pahang from Mentakab to Pekan in a native long-boat, he eventually arrived at the government rest-house in Kuantan where he was told there was no chance of joining any of the Gurkha patrols as they were many miles away in deep jungle. He had to be satisfied with helping out in the ops. room, but as he did not speak Gurkhali he was not much use there either. He began to feel he was never going to take part in a jungle patrol - but that was going to change sooner than he thought.
When Peter returned to 3/KAR, he was sent to ‘A’ Company based in Temerloh in central Pahang. His Company Commander, Major David Swannell, set about educating him in the finer points of jungle warfare and within a day or two of his arrival he was told to prepare himself for a patrol into the ‘ulu’ (jungle). This was a ‘dummy run’ for a new boy, but exciting just the same. He learnt an important lesson - don’t carry anything that’s not vital, like a full bar of soap and a towel - half of each will do.
A few days previously, a patrol from ‘A’ Company had killed three terrorists. One askari had also been killed and the patrol commander decided to visit the scene to see if there were any signs of terrorist activity. They drew a blank but Peter was able to see for himself the primitive conditions under which they lived.
The flanking unit, 4th Battalion Malay Regiment based in Mentakab, had a huge area to cover and could not patrol all of it effectively, so the brigade commander allocated ‘A’ Company 3/KAR a large tract of rubber and jungle to the north. Peter was told by his company commander he would lead a patrol into this previously unknown area; the following day he and 20 askaris set out from camp. They marched through a heavily overgrown rubber estate for a few miles until they came to a fork in the track. One route led into more overgrown rubber while the other branched off into jungle that had been cut down but was growing back again, ie - secondary jungle. Peter decided this would be a good place to set up an overnight camp so he placed sentries 50 yards away on each track.
Just before dark, at about 6pm, one of the sentries fired two shots. Mess tins and food went flying as askaris grabbed their weapons and set off down the track like a pack of hounds. Thirty seconds later there were more shots and by the time the askaris reached the sentry they found that one terrorist had been killed while another was running for his life. He didn't stand a chance and was brought down in a hail of shots as he sought safety in a swamp.
Peter set about transporting the bodies, lashed to saplings, back to camp for identification. He decided to remain in his position for another 24 hours just in case some more terrorists made an appearance, but torrential rain during the night put a stop to movement. He learnt another valuable lesson - how to make a three man ‘basha’ and stay dry!
In mid June 1952, David Swannell received information from Special Branch that terrorists were expected to visit a village in his area that evening. The information was far from being top grade, but nevertheless he decided to act upon it and told Peter Harding to work out a plan for an ambush.
The first part of Peter’s appreciation was done from the map and aerial photographs from which he could see three paths leading from the jungle to the village. The village itself was situated on a broad bend of the Sungei Pahang, the largest river in the state. It would be necessary for the platoon to travel by road to a point where they could disembark and approach the village through a mixture of overgrown rubber and secondary jungle.
The operation commenced during the afternoon and before last light Peter was able to make a reconnaissance of the three approach routes to the village. He decided to set three ambushes, one on each track, with WOPC (Warrant Officer Platoon Commander) Kiberen and three men on the right hand track, Sergeant Tiongi and three men on the left track and himself in the middle with Corporal Kiplangat and Lance Corporal Chipiyego. The remainder of the platoon were to remain in reserve near a hut on high ground between Sgt Tiongi and himself. There had been little time to set the trap but Peter knew what to do.
At 6pm the cicadas started their evening chorus and flying foxes, few in number at first and then in their thousands, came in search of fruit. Mosquitoes started to bite and soon it became dark. The only sounds that broke the silence was a rustle of leaves as a porcupine waddled along the track and the occasional bark of a dog from the village.
It was eight o’clock and Peter was dozing off before taking the ‘ten to midnight stag’ when the silence was ripped apart by gunfire from the bottom of the hill to his right. He grabbed his verey pistol and fired two cartridges which lit up the area. Nothing could be seen at first, then came the sound of someone running up the hill from Kiberen’s position. Peter told Cpl Kiplangat and L/Cpl Chipiyego not to fire until he gave the order.
Within a few seconds, a terrorist appeared and Peter, instead of shooting him, decided to capture him alive. He yelled: “Usipiga,” (Don’t shoot) and then brought the startled CT down in a flying tackle. Peter felt a hammer-like blow and knew he'd been shot. In darkness, it was difficult to know where he had been hit, but he soon became aware that something was wrong with his thumb. Alongside him was a CT who seemed to be dead.
Peter did not blame Cpl Chipiyego for letting off the contents of his Bren gun magazine at two apparent 'terrorists'. He had broken rule No. 3 - 'strict observance of drills' and realised he was lucky not to have been killed.
He attempted to apply a tourniquet on his upper arm but his finger went through the muscle. On further examination he found that one of Chipiyego’s bullets had entered his body under the armpit, exited through the muscle of the upper arm, gone through the terrorist and then into his thumb; the CT was as dead as a doornail.
Another bandit was in the vicinity and, for the second time, bullets whizzed through the trees. Eventually, quietness descended and Peter shouted to WOPC Kiberen, who was still at the bottom of the hill, for a sitrep. Kiberen reported that two CTs had been killed.
Nothing else could be done until first light so Peter instructed Kiberen to join his own group around the hut near Sgt Tiongi’s position. When his men had been concentrated in one area, Peter gave himself a couple of morphine injections and accepted copious cups of tea, well laced with rum, from his orderly, Private Kimelek.
As soon as it became light, Peter could see there was hardly an inch of his jungle green clothing that was not soaked with blood. Despite his severe injuries he walked down the hill with Kiberen and some askaris to see the dead terrorists. Some villagers appeared and it was obvious from the look on their faces they knew the identity of the CTs. Peter regretted not taking them back to Temerloh for questioning, but he had other things on his mind. It was important that he got back to base as soon as possible to have his wounds dressed; three askaris accompanied him to the main road. WOPC Kiberen was left to bring in the remainder of the patrol and the dead CTs.
When Peter and his escort reached the road, they stopped the first vehicle they saw and instructed the driver to take them to Temerloh.
Peter was patched up in the local clinic and was able to give an account of the action before being cas-evacd by air to the British Military Hospital in Kuala Lumpur.
L/Cpl Chipiyego felt badly about shooting his platoon commander but it was not his fault that the ambush commander changed the rules at the last second and he was absolved from blame.

Post-script:- The commanding officer 3/KAR recommended Peter Harding for a Military Cross but this was downgraded to a 'mentioned in despatches'. The brigade commander commented: "Should have had a court martial for breaking the rules!"